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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PARLEY MORTENSON, and 
EDITH MORTENSON, his wife, 
ROY MORTENSON and VERA 
MORTENSON, his wife 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
FINANCIAL GROWTH INC., 
PROFESSIONAL UNITED REALTY 
FLOYD E. BENTON and 
GLEN R. MILNER, 
, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
11343 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action wherein the Plaintiffs claim the De-
fendant, Financial Growth, Inc., materially and totally 
breached an agreement dated August 25, 1967, for the sale 
of real property by Plaintiffs to Defendant, Financial 
Growth, Inc., and wherein Plaintiffs by reason of said 
alleged breach claim an absolute right to terminate said 
agreement. Defendant, Professional United Realty, is a 
licensed real estate company who by counterclaim seeks 
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to recover from Plaintiffs a real estate commission in the 
amount of $28,265.00 earned in connection with the sale of 
the aforesaid property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was argued before the Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson on the law and Motion Calendar on Plaintiffs' Mo-
tion for a Summary Judgment declaring a breach of con-
tract by Defendant, Financial Growth, Inc., and the right 
by Plaintiffs to terminate said contract and for Judgment 
of Dismissal of Defendants' Counterclaim. After a brief 
hearing and argument the Lower Court granted Plaintiffs 
their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants and Appellants seek a reversal of the Low-
er Court's Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and for an Order directing the Lower Court to 
afford Defendants the opportunity for a trial as to all issues 
of fact. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
Professional United Realty, one of the Defendants, is a 
corporation engaged in the sale of real estate within the 
State of Utah. Said Corporation is fully qualified. Floyd E. 
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Benton is an officer of Professional United Realty and is 
employed by said real estate company as a real estate sales-
man. Glen R. Milner is the broker for said real estate com-
pany. On the 26th day of February, 1966, Parley Mortenson, 
one of the Plaintiffs above, caused to be executed a farm 
listing agreement and a sales agency contract involving the 
real property, subject of this proceeding. In so doing he 
acted on behalf of a partnership entity consisting of the 
Plaintiffs herein. A photocopy of the farm listing agreement 
is filed herein as a part of Defendants' Counterclaim, (R.46). 
Within the term of said agreement and on the 25th day of 
April, 1966, Defendant, Professional United Realty by and 
through the efforts of Floyd E. Benton and Glen R. Milner, 
presented an offer to Plaintiffs, meeting all of the require-
ments of the listing agreement aforesaid for the purchase 
of the property, subject of this legal action. The prospective 
buyer was Beehive Development Company. Beehive De-
velopment Company was then ready, willing and able to 
perform according to the terms of the offer (R. 47). Said 
sale was not consummated through no fault of Defendants. 
Subsequently, Defendants, Professional United Realty by 
and through the efforts of Floyd E. Benton and Glen R. 
Milner, obtained a second offer to purchase the subject 
property. Said offer originated from Financial Growth, 
Inc., the other Defendant herein named. Financial Growth, 
Inc., was ready, willing, and able to perform according to 
the terms of said agreement at the time said offer was made 
and is now ready, willing and able to perform according to 
the terms of said agreement. After said offer of Financial 
Growth, Inc., had been presented to Plaintiffs, said Plain-
tiffs, through their legal counsel, caused to be drafted a 
contract of sale (R. 42). Said contract of sale was signed by 
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Mortenson Brothers Company, a partnership, Roy Morten-
son, partner; Parley Mortenson, partner; Roy Mortenson, 
Vera Mortenson, Parley Mortenson, and Edith Mortenson, 
all as Sellers and Financial Growth, Inc., by Douglas L. 
Daily, president and Perry Holley, agent and advisor, at-
tested by Drew D. Kay, assistant secretary, as Buyers. 
Professional United Realty, Floyd E. Benton and Glen R. 
Milner were not parties to this agreement. At the time of 
execution of the agreement August 25" 1967, and pursuant 
to the terms thereof (R. 6), the sum of $3,000.00 was paid 
to the Sellers by Financial Growth, Inc. No part of this 
amount has been tendered back to Defendants by Plaintiffs. 
After the execution of the aforesaid agreements of sale 
a dispute arose between the contracting parties as to the 
amount of acreage under consideration wherein the De-
fendants were informed that a material part of the property, 
to-wit: the designated Kippen acquisition (R. 5) was not 
then available and was not to be included in the contract of 
sale. Further, the Plaintiffs failed and neglected to provide 
in a timely fashion as requested by Defendants, evidence of 
title to the property as was called for in the agreement 
(R. 15), and subsequently, when such evidence was pro-
vided (title insurance binder was finally furnished after 
December 20, 1967), it was made clearly apparent to the 
Defendants that there were material reservations of miner-
al rights which rendered a conveyance of the fee simple 
title impossible of performance by Plaintiffs. Defendants 
requested Plaintiffs to take immediate steps to obtain the 
mineral rights in order to facilitate financing of the entire 
contract as contemplated by the parties at the time of its 
inception. Plaintiffs failed and refused to comply with the 
5 
request of the Defendants and informed the Defendants 
that it would be impossible for Plaintiffs to obtain such 
mineral rights. Plaintiffs thereafter were informed by the 
Defendants that the Defendants stood ready to perform 
according to the tenor of the agreement at such time as 
Plaintiffs were able to cure the defect in the title. 
The Plaintiffs in arr apparent effort to remove any 
cloud that might exist by reason of the agreement to sell 
brought the action herein to establish a breach of the sales 
agreement by the purchasing Defendant, Financial Growth, 
Inc., and to gain a determination of the court of Plaintiffs' 
right to terminate said agreement. Because Plaintiffs elect-
ed to name Professional United Realty, Floyd E. Benton 
and Glen R. Milner as Defendants herein, said Defendants' 
Counterclaim was filed in this proceeding. After a very 
brief hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the Lower Court granted the same. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS ON 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AND OF SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT OF DISMISSAL ON DEFENDANTS' COUNTER-
CLAIM WITHOUT AFFORDING DEFENDANTS A 
TRIAL ON THE ISSUES OF FACT RAISED BY THE 
PLEADINGS. 
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It is a fundamental rule of practice based upon sound 
legal principles that a Motion for Summary Judgment can-
not be granted where there are bona fide issues of material 
facts to be determined. Such determination is the preroga-
tive of the trial court. 
In the sales agreement upon which Plaintiffs' Com-
plaint is based at (R. 11 and 12) Plaintiffs bind themselves 
to convey to the purchaser the fee simple title to said pro-
perty free and clear of all liens and encumbrances except 
as stated in the agreement. Plaintiffs allege in1 Paragraph 4 
of their Complaint (R 2) that they have good and sufficient 
title. Defendants, by way of answer (R 43) expressly deny 
that Plaintiffs have good and sufficient title to the property. 
Hence, we have issue of fact Number 1. 
There was not before the court any testimony or other 
evidence of title to resolve this issue of fact. Argument was 
made that the absence of mineral rights did not substan-
tially impair the title as to excuse Defendants from prompt 
performance of their obligations. Appellants contend that 
absence of such mineral rights in the face of a contract to 
convey a fee simple title, and coupled with a demonstrated 
inability on the part of Plaintiffs to acquire such title even 
at a subsequent period, validly excused the Defendants 
from payment and in fact gave rise to an action for dam-
ages by the Defendants against the Plaintiffs. 
In 102 ALR 1082, the annotation on this subject, it 
states at Page 1083 "The majority rule is that where the 
vendor in an executory contract for the sale of land declares 
,.., 
' 
positively, prior to the time set for performance on his part, 
that he will not perform the contract at all, the vendee may, 
if he so elects, treat the contract as immediatelv breached 
in omnibus, and thereupon maintain an action for dam-
ages." 
At a proper trial of this case, Defendants were pre-
pared to offer evidence that the basis of their contract of 
purchase was in obtaining clear, unencumbered title, in-
cluding mineral rights, for the financial backers and De-
fendants were interested in the land for oil and gas 
exploration. That before the first installment payment was 
due on December 1, 1967, Defendants had many times re-
quested a title insurance binder from Plaintiffs or the ab-
stracts brought to date. Finally Plaintiffs secured a title 
insurance binder dated December 20, 1967, but did not send 
the same to Defendants until January 12, 1968. When the 
Defendants learned thereby that a large number of acres in 
the deal were subject to mineral rights being reserved it 
had a great bearing on their financial program. Therefore 
Defendants made demand upon Plaintiffs to insure them 
that this defect could be cured some way, but Plaintiffs 
replied that it would not be possible to do so. 
All these evidentiary matters, therefore, should have 
been presented to a trial court so that a proper determina-
tion could be had on' whether or not there was in fact a 
breach of a contract, and if so, who breached the same, and 
what damages, if any, may have resulted. 
Plaintiffs plead certain costs and disbursements in con-
nection with this matter. Defendants deny the same. There 
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POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
In Plaintiffs' Motion they asked the Court not only for 
Summary Judgment on their complaint for breach of con-
tract and the right to terminate the agreement, but also for 
Summary Judgment dismissing Defendants' Counterclaim. 
We do not believe the lower court gave proper consid-
eration to either the facts involved or the law surrounding 
these phases of Plaintiffs' Motion. 
It is not clear upon what ground(s) the court granted 
Plaintiffs' Motion, for there are no findings and no other 
comment by the court. However, if we assume the court 
concluded that Defendant, Financial Growth, Inc., was in 
default on the contract of August 25, 1967, and thus allowed 
Plaintiffs to terminate the same, we believe the court erred 
in its conclusion. 
In the first place, Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint 
a failure by Defendants to make an installment payment on 
December 1, 1967, and a total breach of the agreement 
(R 2). Defendants, on the other hand, denied this allegation 
or that there was such breach (R 43, 45). No testimony was 
taken on this material issue of fact, and the court should 
have allowed a hearing to actually determine if there 
was in fact a breach of the contract, and if so, who breached 
it. It is Defendants' contention that if there was a breach 
of the contract at this point it was breached by the Plain-
tiffs. 
11 
Now the agreement clearly provided that Seller, 
(Plaintiffs), would furnish evidence of clear title (R 12, 15). 
It is obvious that Defendants (Purchasers) weren't about 
to pay out almost $153,000.00 until they knew about the 
title to the property. This is the usual and customary pro-
cedure in this type of transaction. Thus when no evidence 
of title was furnished by December 1, 1967, the date of the 
large installment, we submit that as a matter of law no 
breach of contract occured on that date by Defendants in 
not making that payment. In fact Plaintiffs excused and 
waived the payment at least until January 12, 1968, when 
they sent the title insurance binder to Defendants. On that 
date, because there appeared a material defect in the title 
and a dispute arose over the same, we again submit that 
Plaintiffs acquiesced in and excused the large installment 
payment, to see if the dispute could not be resolved. 
Again, even if it should be determined that Plaintiffs 
by their actions did not excuse or waive the large install-
ment payment when it became due, we believe the law sup-
ports the proposition that Defendants were not required to 
perform specifically under the contract where the encum-
brance or defect in the title to the property being furnished 
could not be removed, or that Plaintiffs refused to do so, 
as is our contention here. In 57 ALR 1378, it states: 
"It is the well-settled rule that, to comply with a 
contract to furnish a good title, the vendor must 
furnish a title free from encumbrances. But the fail-
ure of the vendor to remove encumbrances up to the 
time of the trial does not preclude specific perfor-
mance, providing he is able to do so at that time. 
However, he is not entitled to specific performance 
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of a contract for the sale of the W.nd ichere he is un-
able to show that the encumbrances against the pro-
perty may be removed at the time of the trial or at 
least before final decree." 
Also in the same annotation on marketable title, 57 
ALR 1520, the question in point, of the "Refusal of Vendor 
to undertake to cure defects" is discussed at paragraph 6 
as follows: 
"Even though the Vendor might be entitled under 
some circumstances to additional time in which to 
perfect defects in his title, the time in which he is 
entitled to furnish a good title ceases when he 
wrongfully demands that the vendee accept that 
which is not good, and brings an action to enforce a 
forfeiture for his failure to do so." 
It is Defendants' contention that Plaintiffs refused and 
said it was impossible to cure the defect of the mineral res-
ervations on a substantial portion of the land involved. 
This, in essence then, became an anticipatory breach of the 
agreement by Plaintiffs, that they would never be able to 
furnish a clear title. Defendants, therefore, should not be 
compelled to pay out over a half million dollars, knowing 
that it was impossibe to get clear title to the property. De-
fendants were entitled to some consideration of diminution 
of purchase price, damages or other consideration before 
being compelled to pay out their money. 
In 55 Am, Jur 726, Section 283, the law seems clear on 
this point: 
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"Almost all of the cases wherein the point has been 
in a~y way touched upon either hold or recognize 
that if defects or encumbrances of title are of such a 
character that the vendor has neither the title which 
he has agreed to convey nor in a practical sense any 
prospect of acquiring it-that is, if the vendor prob-
ably or presumably will not have the agreed title at 
the time set for the conveyance, the defects or en-
cumbrances being probably or presumably not re-
movable-the vendee is not required to continue 
with the contract, but may rescind, even though the 
time set for conveyance has not arrived." 
The case of Garnett v. Macon, 2 Brock 185, 6 Call (Va.) 
308, Fed Case No. 5,245, is cited in 57 ALR at page 1513 
wherein Justice Marshall states: 
"That the vendor who demands performance must 
have the capacity to do substantially all that he has 
promised before he can entitle himself to the aid of 
the court. At what time this capacity must exist, 
whether it must be at the date of the contract, at the 
time it is to be executed, or at the time of the decree, 
depends upon circumstances which may vary with 
every case. The inquiry in every case must be 
whether the vendor could at the time have conveyed 
such a title as the vendee had a right to command; 
if he could not then, whether he can now; and, if he 
can, whether there has been such a change of cir-
cumstances that a Court of equity ought not to com-
pel the vendee to perform." 
Again in 57 ALR 1413 at paragraph 10 the annotation 
states: 
"Reservations of rights or interest in the land in-
compatible with the full enjoyment and ownership 
in fee, free from all encumbrances, render the title 
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to the land unmarketable, and relieve a vendee of 
the duty of carrying out an executory contract to 
purchase the land, where the contract contains no 
exceptions as to such reservations." 
(See also Culley v. Dixon 199 Iowa 136, 201 N.W. 
582 and Innis v. Costello, II Alberta L.R. 109, 33 
D.L.R. 602--cited in the notes of 57 ALR at pages 
1413 and 1414 in reference to reservation of mineral 
rights.) 
We submit, therefore, that the lower court should not 
have concluded summarily that the Defendants were in de-
fault on the contract and that Plaintiffs had a right to ter-
minate the agreement. On the contrary, Defendants have a 
right to rescind or to seek damages or to obtain a diminu-
tion in the purchase price. 
With reference to the second part of Plaintiffs' motion 
for summary judgment, that of dismissing Defendants' 
counterclaim, again we believe the court erred as a matter 
of law in granting the same. 
The counterclaim of Defendants in this action involves 
the payment of a real estate commission. 
The court seems to have overlooked this problem, oth-
erwise it must have concluded that Defendant, Professional 
United Realty was entitled to a commission, as a matter of 
law, if it felt there were no issues of fact to be determined. 
The only documents the court had before it were the 
sales agency agreement (R 46), where Plaintiffs obligated 
themselves to pay a 10% commission to Professional United 
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Realty should they produce a buyer; also an earnest money 
receipt and offer to purchase (R 47), where a Buyer was 
produced in accordance with the listing agreement; and a 
subsequent contract agreement dated August 25, 1967, ex-
ecuted by Buyers and Sellers (R 4-42). 
There was no question but that the agreement of 
August 25, 1967, to purchase the Plaintiffs' property actual-
ly grew out of the previous offer to purchase, Perry Holley 
being an interested party with both Beehive Development 
Co., the corporation involved on the first offer, and Finan-
cial Growth, Inc., the purchaser on the August 25, 1967 
agreement. This came about, of course, through the efforts 
of Defendant, Professional United Realty. 
Someone, therefore, was obligated to pay a commission 
to Professional United Realty, for they had produced a 
buyer, and $3,000.00 had been paid to and accepted by 
sellers. 
Inasmuch as neither Professional United Realty nor 
its agent, Floyd E. Benton and Glen R. Milner, was a party 
to the contract of August 25, 1967, they must look to Plain-
tiffs for their commission under the previous sales agency 
contract, which we submit was actually extended to Aug-
ust 25, 1967, by the acquiescence, intent, and actions of the 
Parties, and as actually growing out of the offer to purchase 
of Beehive Development Company, Inc. 
Plaintiffs may argue that the Buyers, Financial 
Growth, Inc., were obligated to pay the commission by 
reason of their agreement between themselves (R 10, 11), 
hi 
but in view of the fact that Plaintiffs included Professional 
United Realty as a Defendant in this law suit, and because 
Plaintiffs have determined to terminate the agreement of 
August 25, 1967, and in essence rescind the same, they be-
come obligated to repay to the buyer (Financial Growth, 
Inc.) what they have paid out on the agreement or are ob-
ligated to pay, which included this real estate commission. 
In Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment they 
merely ask the court for an order declaring the real estate 
contract to be breached by Defendant, Financial Growth, 
Inc., and that Plaintiffs have a right to terminate said 
agreement (R 57). We submit that Plaintiffs have elected 
to rescind the agreement. No mention is made of forfeiture 
or damages in their motion. Having elected to rescind the 
agreement, it renders them liable to account to Defendant, 
Financial Growth, Inc., for what they are out, which 
amounts to $3,000.00 down payment and $28,265.00 in com-
missions. 
In support of this view we cite the annotation of 59 
ALR 215, paragraph 4(a): 
"As shown in the foregoing cases, where the vendee 
has defaulted in carrying out the provisions of a 
contract, the vendor may waive the default, or he 
may exercise the right of forfeiture authorized by 
the contract; and where the contract contains no 
forfeiture provision, he may terminate it if the ven-
dee fails to perform after demand is made and a 
reasonable opportunity given. Instead of pursuing 
these remedies, however, the vendor may rescind 
the contract for the default of the vendee, and, since 
rescission of a contract contemplates placing the 
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parties in statu quo, according to some of the cases, 
the vendor, by rescinding the contract for default of 
vendee, renders himself liable to account to the lat-
ter for the amount paid on the purchase price, espe-
cially where the contract contains no provision mak-
ing time of the essence thereof and providing for the 
forfeiture of payments made by the vendee." 
Now the argument made above contemplates that 
Plaintiffs had a right to rescind the contract by reason of 
the default of Financial Growth, Inc. However, Defendants 
contend that there was no breach or default by Financial 
Growth, Inc., but the breach or default, if any, was on the 
part of Plaintiffs in not being able to cure the title defects, 
now or later, and in fact entitled Defendants to claim dam-
ages against Plaintiffs, part of which amounts to the sales 
commission of $28,365.00. (See the annotation at 102 ALR 
1082 previously cited on this point). 
Therefore, it appears to counsel for Defendants that 
under any of these theories argued herein Defendants are 
entitled, as a matter of law, to the amount claimed as real 
estate commissions, or in the very least, a further trial court 
hearing on these matters. 
POINT THREE 
IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT RE-
QUIRING PLAINTIFFS TO REFUND TO DEFENDANT 
ITS MONEY PAID ON THE LAND. 
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Assuming, for the purpose of this argument, that the 
Court could properly grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, it 
was still incumbent upon the court to order a refund to the 
Defendant, Financial Growth, Inc., by Plaintiffs of the 
$3,000.00 down payment. 
Now here in the pleadings, and certainly not in Plain-
tiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, was there mention of 
Plaintiffs' declaring a forfeiture of the moneys paid in, or 
the right to retain the same, on any theory. Plaintiffs mere-
ly asked the Court for the right to terminate the contract 
(R 57). This amounted to a rescission or repudiation of the 
contract by Plaintiffs and obligated them to refund the 
down payment. We refer the court to our argument on this 
matter in our Point Two. 
"Forfeiture and rescission are imcompatible and 
will not mix. The concomitant of rescission is resti-
tution, not forfeiture." (See Johnson v. Gilbert, 234 
Or. 350; 382 P 2nd 87). 
Also in 17 Am Jur 2nd 994, Section 512, it states: 
"The very idea of rescinding a contract implies that 
what has been parted with shall be restored on both 
sides, and hence the general rule which is to be 
reasonably applied and is subject to certain excep-
tions, is that a party who wishes to rescind a con-
tract must place the opposite party in statu quo." 
(See also Peterson v. Hodges, 121 Utah 72; 239 P 
2nd 180). 
Furthermore, it would be most inequitable and unjust 
to allow Plaintiffs to terminate the contract and retain the 
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$3,000.00 down payment, when Plaintiffs were unable to 
perform under the contract, as to title, even if the Court 
could properly consider Defendants to be in default on 
their installment payment. 
Finally, the contract of August 25, 1967, itself would. 
at least, require Plaintiffs to make refund of this $3,000.00 
(R 12). It states under the paragraph entitled "CURE OF 
ENCUMBRANCES AND LIENS" as follows: 
"If Seller shall be unable to deliver or cause to be 
delivered a deed or deeds conveying the fee simple 
title to the property, free of all liens and encumbran-
ces except as herein stated, and if Purchaser shall 
not exercise the privilege (which Purchaser shall 
have) of waiving the liens and encumbrances which 
shall be the basis of such inability and accept the 
title in its then condition without diminution of the 
purchase price and without claim or demand against 
Seller, then the aforesaid payments made by Pur-
chaser to Seller, shall be refunded without interest 
to Purchaser . . . " 
It is Defendants' contention, however, that they have 
other claims or demands against Seller (Plaintiffs), but in 
the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the least that should 
be done by reason of the incurable title defects, is for Plain-
tiffs to refund Defendant's $3,000.00 down payment, and 
the lower court should have so ordered if it was going to 
grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
In view of the fact that the pleadings in this case raise 
several material issues of fact, and in view of the material 
dispute between Plaintiffs and Defendants, as raised by the 
pleadings, on whether there was in fact a breach of contract 
by Defendants as well as a commission earned by Defen-
dant, Professional United Realty, we respectfully petition 
this court to reverse the lower court's order granting Plain-
tiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, so that Defendants 
may properly have their day in court. 
Further, the lower court should be required to make a 
disposition of the $3,000.00 down payment on the contract 
as petitioned for in this brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SPAFFORD & YOUNG 
Suite 201, Dixon Building 
2188 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
